this decision seems to perpetuate a questionable line of reasoning that rests on assumptions (stress needn’t be marked in these situations because its presence and placement can be inferred) that are only largely, but not entirely, supported by the facts of the language. The curved superscript diacritic over the letter ü is oddly displaced to the right in a few places (e.g., 3 of of 8 times in the list of sources, 195–96).

Whether instructors will adopt Fundamentals as the primary textbook for their Structure of Russian courses is likely to depend on how effective they find the usage-based explanatory model. Even those instructors who prefer a more abstract generative model for pedagogical reasons, though, should nonetheless consider incorporating the material from the historical portion of the book into their courses. And perhaps not just at the advanced level; if you’ve taught first-year Russian, you’ve probably had students ask “so where does that peculiar hard sign come from anyway?” You can find an accessible explanation on p. 161.

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David Pesetsky’s Russian Case Morphology and the Syntactic Categories (MIT Press, 2013) is one of the most thought-provoking works of theoretical linguistics to appear in many years. It provides a startlingly original analysis of a well-known thorny problem of Russian morpho-syntax, embedding the analysis of that puzzle within a radical rethinking of the role of case in syntactic theory, and taking us on a journey of consequences and extensions that challenge one’s views of many aspects of minimalist theory, including key components of case theory, phrase structure, locality and others. If a monograph is to be judged by its creativity, its significance for the theoretical field at large and the range of details of its technical implementation, then Russian Case Morphology and the Syntactic Categories deserves mention among some of the most significant recent works of theoretical linguistics.
Readers must approach the work with an open mind, however, and be willing to adjust, and in some cases, abandon core assumptions about syntactic relations in order to embrace the proposed system. Many, though not all, of those adjustments seem worth the effort; it remains to be seen to what degree syntactic theory as a whole will alter its course to accommodate the full set of necessary changes. In this review, I will not attempt to weigh the benefits against the costs of the proposed system. Rather, I will describe the structure of the theory Pesetsky builds to solve the Russian Paucal Puzzle, an apparently minor puzzle of Russian morphosyntax, introduced in Chapter 1, and raise some concerns about consequences that might be less innocuous than they might seem at first glance. First and foremost, however, my goal is simply to encourage people to read the book and judge for themselves. It is not only persuasively written and constructed, it is highly enjoyable to explore.

The core meta-theoretical question underlying the monograph is presented in Chapter 2, namely: “why is there case?” Related to this is the question of the elusive relationship between the set of morphological case paradigms we find in highly inflected languages such as Russian and the syntactic structure in which they occur -- can this relation be systematically captured in an enlightening way? In Chapter 2, Pesetsky discusses and dismisses the possibility that the morphological categories known as Genitive, Accusative, Nominative and so on can be reduced to something morphologically more basic, while at the same time arguing that it is a worthwhile project to try to relate those categories to something more basic within the syntactic apparatus. And this is exactly what the book proposes to do— to reduce (the primary) morphological case categories (at least 4 of them) to part of speech morphology – in the form of a direct relationship of the following form:

(1) Reduction of case to part of speech categories: (Pesetsky p. 7)
   a. Genitive $\rightarrow$ N        b. Accusative $\rightarrow$ V
   c. Nominative $\rightarrow$ D    d. Oblique $\rightarrow$ P

The claim is that the cases listed in (1) are simply morphological instantiations of the associated part of speech categories. That is, Genitive case morphology is the appearance of [N], Accusative is [V], Oblique case is [P], and Nominative case is [D]. Some of these associations are of course
familiar from case assignment systems – in three of the four instances (a,b,d) the claim may seem somewhat unremarkable – we often think of Accusative as canonically “assigned” by V (or v), of Genitive, at least in adnominal usages, as being “assigned” by N and of Oblique as being “assigned” by P\(^1\) (I return below to the 4\(^{th}\) claim, (c) the issue of D and Nominative case). However, such familiar case “assignment” by a head to its complement represents only the first of two ways that part of speech features can end up on an element in Pesetsky’s system. What is unexpected about Pesetsky’s version of these associations is that what he means by (1) is not (only) that these category heads “assign” this case to their complements (and inside their complements), but also that they “wear them on their sleeves,” themselves. This is particularly relevant for Genitive, which is the “primeval” form of the NP part of nominals, as given in (2).

(2) “Primeval genitive” conjecture (Pesetsky p. 9)

\[ N_{GEN} \] categorizes a Russian root as a Noun (in the lexicon)

That is to say, NPs (a sub-structure of DPs) are themselves inherently Genitive – Genitive case simply IS a spellout of the category feature [N]. If nothing else happens to mask its appearance, an NP (at least in Russian) will surface as Genitive -- “you are what you assign.”\(^2\) The theoretical benefits should be fairly obvious – cases are reduced to parts of speech, an undeniable primitive of any grammatical system.\(^3\)

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\(^1\)Pesetsky leaves aside the issue of distinction among Obliques (Instrumental vs. Dative vs. Prepositional, etc), though he does tackle some of the issues of Prepositions that assign Accusative (Section 7.3) and Genitive (Section 8.5). He also does not address other possibly structural instances of Genitive unrelated to primeval instances, such as Genitive of negation, Genitive time expressions, Genitive after intensional verbs and others.

\(^2\)Pesetsky does not concern himself in detail with the cross-linguistic consequences of this approach to case, except with regard to the possibility of a default-like Nominative case emanating from the category D in Russian, but possibly not elsewhere, (see Chapter 7). However, the implication is that the essential relations given in (1) are universal, with differing systems of morphological realization. How this relates to languages with more than 4 major distinct case categories, or to ergative systems, is not taken up in the monograph, though it certainly opens up new ways of approaching such questions.

\(^3\)Interestingly, the notion that a case is just the spellout of its traditional assigner’s part of speech category is one of the best-known strengths of a series of papers by Pesetsky and Torrego (2001, 2007), in which Nominative (and Accusative) are claimed to be reflexes of T. That is not one of the associations proposed in this work, but it is a direct precursor of
Of course, many, if not most, NPs do not in fact surface with Genitive case. This leads us to Pesetsky’s other major innovation in the book, namely the system of case stacking and overwrite that he promotes. The basic assumption is that cases stack, so that the primeval Genitive that NPs carry finds itself stacked within the Nominative layer associated with D, which in turn could be stacked within an Accusative layer associated with V or an Oblique layer associated with P and so on. Thus we would often expect to have a situation such as (3):

(3) Case stacking: [PP P0 [DP D0 [NP N0GEN ]N0NOM ]N0ACC ]

in which 3 cases are stacked on N, in the layering GEN > NOM > OBL. A case realization rule, such as (4) then determines which element surfaces in the morphology:

(4) The One-Suffix Rule: Delete all but the outermost case suffix. (Pesetsky p. 11)

Thus we find Oblique case on objects of prepositions because it is the outermost suffix in the construction and not because it is the only one. It simply “overwrites” the Nominative and Genitive cases already stacked on the relevant elements. Note that this system contrasts sharply with more standard approaches to the locality of case-assignment, whereby a more local head simply blocks the application of a more distant case-assigning head, as might be expected within Relativized Minimality (Rizzi 1990, 2004 etc.). Indeed, Pesetsky removes locality from the case assignment component of the grammar, other than through the indirect mediation of phases, a move whose consequences are taken up in detail in the later chapters of the book, especially Chapters 7 and 8.) In fact, a recurring

the idea of associating part of speech with case realization. I return below to the question of whether [T] in fact might be a better candidate for Nominative than [D], even given the rest of Pesetsky’s assumptions in the book.

On p. 101, this is replaced by the The One-Prototype Rule:

In the configuration [β n x [β n y … [β …]]] (order irrelevant), where x and y are the realization of prototypes, delete y.

The prototype version is not relevant to the discussion at hand about Pesetsky’s general case-stacking resolution (“overwrite”) system.
theme of the book concerns the burdens faced by an overwrite-based system of case realization as compared with a locality-based system, and how to overcome them. I say “burdens” because although the overwrite system solves the core Russian morphosyntactic puzzle, in some ways for the first time satisfactorily, the solution comes with a cost in terms of expectations of overwrite in many instances where it is not found. Proponents of Pesetsky’s approach will want to find additional instances where overwrite accounts for linguistic phenomena better than locality does.

Because there is a claim of universal case stacking, we have an expectation that overt instances of case-stacking would occur in some languages. One such language, Lardil, is examined in detail in Chapter 3, (and a more subtle version of overt stacking is also proposed to account for certain Russian word internal morphology in Chapter 9 -- that of certain personal possessives such as Mašina kniga [“Masha’s book”]). In the absence of overt case-stacking in the majority of instances, however, it is a morphological resolution rule such as (4) that determines which of the stacked cases appears, namely the outer one.

Now, why might we prefer a grammar with a case-stacking and overwrite system over a system of locality? We would prefer it if there were grammatical phenomena in which a primeval category/case surfaces in certain instances, but is overwritten by a higher category/case feature in other instances. That is, if there are clear instances of higher case manifestation within what appears to be the domain of a more local case assigner, then the stacking+overwrite system has a clear advantage over one of absolute locality. The Russian PaucaI Puzzle is exactly such an instance, and it is careful analysis of this long-standing problem that is Pesetsky’s central accomplishment in the book, the details of which occupy Chapters 4-6.

In order to elucidate the ingenuity of the solution offered, one needs to understand the basic puzzle, which I will present briefly here. The Russian paucal numerals (“2”, “3”, “4”, “1.5” and certain other lexical items), themselves marked Nominative or Accusative (in Nominative or Accusative contexts) are typically followed by adjectives in the Genitive plural and nouns in the Genitive singular, but can be preceded by Nominative plural elements. This so-called heterogeneous pattern is shown in (5).
The number mismatch is resolved by Pesetsky in Chapter 4 in a particularly creative way. This is the core of the analysis: in keeping with

Traditional case literature involving the higher numeral “5” and above has been resolved by appealing to a Case Hierarchy (see Babby 1987), whereby lexical case outranks structural case, allowing apparently non-local case assignment in (6). Of course such a system can in and of itself be understood as a precursor to an overwrite system, as it also defies standard locality of case assignment. Another relevant overwrite system is proposed in Matushansky (2010), with regard to other puzzles of Russian case.
somewhat similar–looking classifier systems, the paucal is analyzed as a self-standing [-sg] number (Nbr) head (with which adjectives show number agreement, hence their plural form). Crucially, the head noun in the construction is *numberless*, given the separate manifestation of the Nbr element. It is the ability in Russian to have the Nbr feature surface independently that allows the construction in (5). The Nbr element is generated low, and raises to D (in fact through an intermediate Q position, whose relevance is discussed in detail in Chapter 6), and the noun remains numberless. At Spellout, a default number form surfaces, which mimics the singular. The number mismatch is thus explained. (In Oblique overwrite instances such as (6), the P head acquires a [-sg] value from below and passes it down into the NP domain, thus eliminating the number mismatch in those cases as needed.)

The strength of the analysis is in its derivation of the case pattern in (5). This works as follows: the raising of the Nbr head to D means that when D merges with NP, NP does not entirely satisfy the “complementation requirements” of D, and this renders D powerless to allow Nominative to overwrite the Genitive below. Thus the appearance of Primeval Genitive is directly tied to the separate head status of the paucal. Overwrite by $D_{\text{NOM}}$ is impossible, while overwrite by a higher $P_{\text{OBL}}$ is not only expected, but required. The case contrast between (5) and (6) is now derived.

Chapter 5 then follows with a brilliant piece of confirming evidence that paucal Nbr elements are indeed generated *lower* than the adjectives that follow them in surface order and raise to a higher spot. The evidence comes from certain feminizable Class I nouns (typically masculine), such as vrač (‘doctor’), whose intricate patterns of agreement are the subject of Chapter 5. Lebanese Arabic is shown to have an identical system in its number agreement; both systems show that a mismatch of features of a certain kind can be explained by the insertion of a feminizing (Russian) or pluralizing (Arabic) morpheme in the spine of the nominal, but only at a certain height. Pesetsky proves that that height is lower than adjectives, and thus derives the claimed base position of the paucal Nbr heads. The evidence is incontrovertible and the analysis high in originality and elegance.

Chapter 6 then extends the analysis to constructions with higher numerals, which do not show a number mismatch, but have the same case
situation as paucals. The puzzle here is essentially the same – in Nominative/Accusative environments we get a heterogeneous pattern, whereas in Oblique contexts we get Oblique homogeneity throughout.

• higher numerals in Nom/Acc context (gender neutralized)
  = Heterogeneous pattern:
(7) èti pjať novyx stolov
these-NOM.PL 5-NOM new-GEN.PL tables-GEN.PL
“these five new tables”

• higher numerals in oblique context (gender neutralized)
  = Homogenous pattern:
(8) s ètimi pjať’ju [novymi stolami]
with these-INSTR.PL 5-INSTR [new table]-INSTR.PL
“with these five new tables”

The analysis of numerals such as “5” is essentially the same as for paucals, though technical issues of number agreement and complementation requirements might need closer scrutiny to determine all consequences. Certain assumptions about the timing of the derivation, spellout, and the inability to value number need to be accepted to allow things to proceed, but if that much is granted, the elegant solution for the paucal numbers extends naturally to the higher numbers. The overwrite system remains at the core of the analysis, and the potential advantage of eliminating case locality and directly associating case with part of speech is maintained as the meta-goal of the approach. This alone sets Pesetsky’s book apart from many other works on this topic.

Pesetsky’s monograph is also to be praised for its honest attempt at addressing potentially problematic consequences, such as the expectation that we would find overwrite in all sorts of instances where we do not find it – such as verbal Accusative overwriting into the paucal domain, Oblique and Accusative overwriting into the adnominal Genitive domain and various others. Chapters 7 and 8 address this potential problem. The essential insight is that DPs form *phases* that exempt them from the reach of overwrite from above, thereby maintaining the apparent effect of case assignment locality into, say, an adnominal Genitive domain within a PP. In the absence of phasehood, however, we expect outer case instances to
overwrite inner ones. One might also expect non-local overwrite to be more typologically prevalent (the book offers us only the Russian numerical constructions in Oblique contexts as examples of overwrite), a consequence Pesetsky does not discuss.

By virtue of pioneering a new approach to old problems, Pesetsky’s monograph forces us to accept a fairly wide range of non-conventional assumptions and conclusions. The discussion of prototypes and selection in Chapter 9 is one such consequence of the larger system, whereby we must worry about the spread of plural features to “numberless” nouns in paucal constructions (or lack thereof) in the relevant constructions. When the paucal is Nominative and the head noun Genitive (as in (5)), we have to be sure (a) that Nominative case does not overwrite Genitive and (b) that plural number spreads throughout the constructions in Oblique contexts, but not in Nominative contexts. The machinery created to achieve the necessary result is to value P for number in the course of the derivation rather than inherently. However, we would not expect this to be possible with a singular N taking a plural DP complement, since N enters the derivation carrying number. (Clearly, this is an issue standard theories do not face). For this reason, Pesetsky offers the prototype system described in Chapter 9, and then delves into additional support for it, including a possible analysis of English “little words” such as of, which turn out to be the prototype heads themselves surfacing in the syntax. This nicely exemplifies the reach of the monograph – it carries us from analysis of a minor mismatch problem in a single language through a serious re-imagining of the status of case in grammar, with important consequences for number valuation, that in turn require a rethinking of selection, leading to a possible analysis for a set of initially entirely unrelated items that may have previously defied satisfactory analysis. This is how the best results in science are often discovered, and Pesetsky is a master tour guide through such unchartered territories.

It must be noted, however, that the journey is not without stops that are less appealing than others. Readers will have to decide for themselves the degree to which the end result is worth the difficult journey – for me there were three such required “stops” that caused concern, all involving the “structural” cases (Nominative and Accusative). One, discussed in Chapter 5, concerns the status of Nominative case in Pesetsky’s larger case theory. The second is perhaps the hardest to swallow for those
dedicated to theoretical elegance, namely the unfortunate need for Pesetsky to maintain a notion of abstract case, in the form of “Vergnaud-licensing,” alongside the otherwise satisfying reduction of case to part-of-speech features. The third, and perhaps most worrisome for Russianists, involves the proposed divorce of Nominative and Accusative “contexts” under which the primeval Genitive appears, (both discussed in Chapter 7).

The three issues are all related, stemming from Pesetsky’s claim that Nominative case is a reflex of the D category, meaning, in essence, that all else being equal, DPs (can and do) assign (Nominative) case to themselves. This is the “D_NOM claim”. This claim is, of course, at odds with a long linguistic tradition associating Nominative case with (finite) T, and, ironically, at odds with the 2001/2007 claim by Pesetsky & Torrego that Nominative case is the realization of T on nominals. Here, Nominative is claimed to represent a different category (D) than it is in the Pesetsky & Torrego papers (T). The discussion of default case in Chapter 7 brings only partial satisfaction in this regard – the interested reader will have to decide for him/herself whether the advantages of looking at things this way outweigh the potential pitfalls. For advocates of the original P&T notion that Nominative is simply [T] morphology on nominals, it may be hard to embrace the D_NOM claim for various reasons.

For one thing, to accept D_NOM claim we have to abandon traditional generative approaches to Nominative as being somehow related to T. There are well-known paradigms of finite vs. non-finite contexts where nominals are licensed and not-licensed, respectively, that would now have to be disassociated with the morphological appearance of Nominative case. Instead, Nominative will appear on any DP not otherwise overwritten from above. As Pesetsky argues, this accords with notions of

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6Ironically, because although the P&T claim is an important precursor to the central claim about case in the current monograph, (namely that it is nothing more than a spellout of a part of speech feature) the details differ so radically.
7At least for Russian. Pesetsky does allow the possibility (p. 74) that “[T might be a [Nominal] morphology assigner in other languages.”
Nominative as a default case. But it no longer allows us to relate Nominative morphology to certain kinds of syntactic environments.\(^8\) Thus, traditional characterizations of case positions vs. non-case positions, such as, say, the object of active vs. passive verbs, will also have to be entirely divorced from the actual appearance of Nominative case. So the theory still needs the equivalent of abstract case-licensing to determine why the object of a passive verb is not licensed \textit{in situ}, with Nominative, and so Pesetsky maintains abstract case in the system, relabeling it “Vergnaud-licensing” in (9):

(9) Feature Assignment (FA) and licensing (Pesetsky, p. 75)
FA applies to DP only in the position in which it is Vergnaud-licensed

Although Vergnaud-licensing is nowhere defined by Pesetsky, it is, for all intents and purposes, the Case Filter. He does not define it, but presumably assumes what is standardly assumed, namely that Vergnaud licensors are (typical) case assigners, (and that something about passive and unaccusative verbs interferes with Vergnaud-licensing). For Pesetsky, (9) \textit{blocks} Accusative, and default Nominative appears. There is no discussion of why Vergnaud-licensing fails here, but clearly it must. So we need a system of abstract case licensing. However, the need to maintain something like Vergnaud-licensing in Pesetsky’s system comes as a disappointment, given the book’s remarkable achievements in (otherwise) reducing case to part of speech, and also considering the fairly significant overlap between the part of speech $\rightarrow$ case associations in (1) and the presumed class of Vergnaud-licensors (V; P; N, etc.). We neither eliminate abstract case, nor have insight into this potentially significant overlap.

There may be a way out: notice that it is primarily Pesetsky’s \textsc{D NOM} claim that underlies the need for Vergnaud-licensing. If instead Nominative were associated with a category \textit{outside} DP (such as [T]), then (9) (blocking of case due to lack of Vergnaud-licensing) would perhaps not be necessary. Whenever DP objects of passives get no Accusative from \textit{V} (an assumption every system needs), Nominative (from \textit{T}) would appear

\(^8\)Note, importantly, that the monograph’s claims about Accusative ($=[V]$), Oblique ($=[P]$), and even Genitive ($=[N]$) in the adnominal instances, do not encounter this issue, - as pointed out above, these associations accord with traditional notions of case assignment, for the most part. But that is not true of Nominative and D.
as expected. That is, Vergnaud-licensing would be worked into the associations in (1) rather than be entirely divorced from them.\textsuperscript{9} As it stands, we are forced to maintain Pesetsky’s conclusion, following Schütze (2001), that “licensing and morphological case are independent systems... [D]efault case ... can never ‘save’ a DP from violating the Case Filter.” (p. 73)

The third consequence of the D\textsubscript{NOM} system involves the necessary separation of Nominative and Accusative contexts for the purposes of the Paucal (and higher numeral) Puzzle. In Pesetsky’s system, we expect Acc to overwrite Nom and Gen (in Accusative contexts), and this needs to be prevented. That is, we expect the primeval Genitive of (5) in paucals to disappear when the phrase is an object, as in (10):

(10) a. expected form in Accusative context, showing Accusative overwrite:

*ja vîdel [dva novyx stoly]  
I saw 2-Acc new-Acc.Pl table-Acc.pl  
“I saw two new tables”

b. actual form in Accusative context, traditional labeling:

ja vîdel [dva novyx stola]  
I saw 2-Acc new-Gen.Pl table-Gen.Sg  
“I saw two new tables”

c. actual form in Accusative context, with Pesetsky’s labeling:

ja vîdel [dva novyx stola]  
I saw 2-NOM new-Gen.Pl table-Gen.Sg  
“I saw two new tables”

First and foremost, the system must prevent (10)a, in which Accusative overwrites primeval Genitive.

Chapter 7 deals with this prevention, attributing it to a complex system of resistance to Accusative overwrite in exactly those instances

\textsuperscript{9}Granted, this is a significant change to the system – the Paucal Puzzle would have to be resolved somewhat differently. It is not my place to suggest significant revisions to the Pesetsky theory, but it is interesting that all three issues discussed here involve the D\textsubscript{NOM} claim in particular.
where Accusative and Nominative morphology are identical (traditionally known as syncretism). Identity of form allows Pesetsky to claim that the apparently Accusative form of the paucal in (10), is in fact Nominative. He argues that “we are clearly not dealing with mere syncretism between NOM and ACC, but with genuine NOM morphology in a position where we might have expected to see ACC” (p 64).¹⁰

Because the Nominative and Accusative forms of the numbers are indistinguishable, an analysis that the paucals are truly Nominative here is not impossible. Pesetsky is well aware of the consequences of such a move, and devotes considerable discussion to the rules that will make all of this work out correctly (the focus of Chapter 7). The details are well-attended to, as throughout the book, and the overall account survives. But we lose something we might miss – the generalization that there is parallel blocking at work in structural case environments with paucals, disallowing (traditional) structural case assignment from outside paucals.¹¹, ¹²

¹⁰In fact, this conclusion is not entirely clear. The claim is that some such objects are true Nominative and some are true Accusative, depending on a morphologically stipulated blocking rule. This inanimate Class I and plural nouns in Accusative context surface as Nominative (syncretism!), whereas with animate paucal constructions we appear to have real Accusative (surfacing as Genitive, as animate plurals always do: (ja videl [dvux mužčin]-Gen.Pl (“I saw two men”). Such instances might be analyzed as animate Accusative versions of collective numerals however, required anyway for constructions such as dvoe mužčin (“a twosome of men”), as Pesetsky points out. If so, then the need for a non-syncretism account might be avoided. I thank Boris Jacobson for pointing out this possibility to me.

¹¹Indeed, it is the fact that in both structural case contexts paucals show the heterogeneous pattern that led Babby (1987) to propose a grammaticalization of the distinction through a case conflict resolution hierarchy whereby Lexical (Oblique) case wins out over Structural case. This is also a form of overwrite, and a proposal of non-locality, and as such is an important precursor of the Pesetsky account as we have seen. However, for Babby, the unification of the heterogeneous contexts (Nominative and Accusative) is maintained.

¹²Note that if, as discussed above, Nominative were indeed related to a category outside DP (such as [T]), just as Accusative is related to [V], then the blocking at hand could possibly still be related to the separate head status of the paucal (essentially, Pesetsky’s analysis of the heterogeneous pattern) in both instances, delimiting the domain of Accusative and Nominative in parallel ways, though details would have to differ from how things are done by Pesetsky now. However, the case as part of speech and overwrite system could still be maintained without having to analyze differently the Nominative and Accusative contexts that trigger the heterogeneous paucal pattern.
One final note. It is important to realize that the overwrite system and the category=case system are not necessarily co-extensive. That is, Pesetsky’s proposed system of association between parts of speech and (traditional) case categories does not, in and of itself, entail a stacking and overwrite resolution system over one of strict locality of case-assigning heads. The former is the large meta-project of Pesetsky’s book, intended to relate case to something more basic in the grammar, and even if some details raise questions, the overall enterprise is surely one to be taken very seriously as things move forward. It potentially answers questions about the existence of case, and places the relation between abstract and morphological case in important new light. The overwrite piece, on the other hand, stands on slightly shakier ground typologically, if only because we see its application in the Russian numerical oblique contexts but perhaps not elsewhere, and because it leads to a set of anti-locality assumptions that we might not otherwise want. But it certainly solves the Paucal Puzzle and various other troublesome issues of Russian morphosyntax, in a creative and significant way. And it forces us to revisit core aspects of our theory and to consider fairly radical alternatives through the lens of meticulous analysis of small syntactic puzzles. This is the best kind of linguistic science.

Works Cited

Alexander Burak’s book “The Other” in Translation does two things: it draws attention to the field of Comparative Translation Discourse Analysis, with reference to numerous concrete examples, and it offers thought-provoking and informative discussion of a number of translation situations drawn from the interactions of Russian and Anglophone literature and culture. The book will be especially interesting to students and teachers of Russian at all levels, but it also has a great deal to offer readers from other languages and literatures, especially those with a background in translation studies.

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